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Don't Get it Twisted:




Does the way I wear my hair make me a better person?
Does the way I wear my hair make me a better friend?
Does the way I wear my hair determine my integrity?
I am expressing my creativity .. .
If I wanna shave it close
Or if I wanna rock locks ...
If I wanna wear it braided
All down my back
I don't see what's wrong with that ... 1
The above quote, by soul singer India Arie, captures the
discourse this note attempts to advance. This note, however, takes
the lyrics one step further and maintains that certain employer
hairstyle prohibitions constrain African-American cultural identity
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1. INDIA ARIE, I Am Not My Hair, on TESTIMONY 1: VOL. 1, LIFE & RELATIONSHIP
(Motown Records 2006).
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and are racially discriminatory in nature. Such prohibitions are
discriminatory because African-American hairstyleS2 are cultural
practices which express group realities, and sometimes
"discrimination against racially correlated cultural practices is really
just a proxy for forbidden racial discrimination." 3
Employer grooming policies prohibiting and, to some extent,
"criminalizing" natural hairstyles demonstrate that certain African-
American hairstyle choices are not wanted in the private workplace.4
A workplace, I maintain, is no exception to Andrew Hacker's theory
that "America is inherently a white country: in character, in
structure, in culture."5 An institution I further argue is strictly and
stringently controlled by Anglo-American standards of behavior and
appearance that are imposed on all workers.6
For African Americans specifically, judicial holdings and
administrative decisions both point to the fact that they are
forbidden from working in the private sector without assimilating
their looks into Anglo-American normative beauty ideals.7
Employer hairstyle prohibitions reserve the right of Anglo-
Americans to determine the "whiteness" or "non-whiteness" of
African Americans by refusing to give legitimacy to African-
American hairstyle choices, which are disfavored by Anglo-
American society. These regulations are not facially violative of Title
VII because they do not ask, "Who is White?" - an inquiry that is
explicitly discriminatory; but rather, "Who may be considered
White?"8 - an inquiry - that does not trigger Title VII protections.
2. African-American hairstyles include the Afro, cornrows, all-braided hairstyles
and dreadlocks. I refer to them as "African American" or "natural" hairstyles because
they are worn predominately (albeit not exclusively) by Blacks and do not require the
individual to alter his or her natural hair texture through the use of chemical agents.
3. See Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. REv. 1803, 1812 (2000).
4. Marc Lamont Hill, Baltimore Police Ban Natural Hairstyles (Dec. 21, 2006),
http://www.marclamonthill.com/baltimore-police-ban-natural-hairstyles-1 727 (Baltim-
ore Police Department suggested that these hairstyles are worn by "criminals" and are
not appropriate for police officers) (last visited Sep. 24, 2011).
5. ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE,
UNEQUAL 3 (Simon & Schuster 2003) (1992) (noting that African Americans face
boundaries and constrictions set by the White majority).
6. See Ashleigh Shelby Rosette & Tracy Dumas, The Hair Dilemma: Conform to
Mainstream Expectations or Emphasize Racial Identity, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 407,
408 (2007); AYANA D. BYRD & LORI L. THARPS, HAIR STORY: UNTANGLING THE ROOTS OF
BLACK HAIR IN AMERICA 26 (St. Martin's Press 2001) (noting that the accepted image for
Blacks desiring to access the American dream is that of a well-groomed White man or
White woman).
7. See BYRD, supra note 6, at 102-07.
8. Id. Rule 7.34 of The Chicago Manual of Style notes that when describing
nationalities, tribes and other groups of people, "designations that are capitalized when
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For its framework, this note will examine employer appearance
and grooming policies that prohibit certain African-American
hairstyles to determine whether the policies are racially
discriminatory and violate Title VII. This note is divided into three
parts.
Part I, section A, begins by presenting cases which argue that
employer appearance policies prohibiting African-American
hairstyles are racially discriminatory. Section B presents the
judiciary's response which, I maintain, clothes private employers
with the complete authority to regulate the hairstyles of its African-
American employees. Section C then demonstrates the
superiority/ inferiority complex these policies perpetuate between
the races. Part I concludes by arguing that the judiciary's response is
antithetical to Title VII's purpose - to prohibit discriminatory
employment policies that disproportionately affect members of a
protected class.
Part II focuses on how race should be legally defined for the
purposes of protection under Title VII. This article presents two
notions of race: first, the notion that race is biological; and second,
the contention that race is a social construction. This note advances
that race should be defined by the cultural and physical truths that
reflect the historical and cultural realities of a people. Although I
envision such a definition may reinforce social stereotypes, I intend
to demonstrate that Anglo-Americans and African Americans have
conceivably different cultural expressions, and these differences are
not necessarily damaging to employer interests. One culture is not
superior to the other. One culture is not normal, while the other is
abnormal; nor is one deficient because it does not follow the same
appearance and grooming practices of the other. The cultures are
just different. Part II concludes by arguing that because Title VII
expressly distinguishes between discrimination based on skin color
and discrimination based on race, race as used under Title VII must
mean the cultural and physical characteristics of a people.
Finally, in Part III, I recommend that protection against race
discrimination under Title VII should apply to appearance and
grooming policies that constrain the cultural identity of minority
workers and further suggest approaches to realize this goal.
referring to specific peoples are lower case when applied more generally." UNIVERSITY
OF CHICAGO PRESS, THE CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE 246-47 (14th ed. 1993). Rule 7.35
states, "The term Black is now often capitalized as the widely accepted name of the dark-
skinned group or groups of people originating in Africa ... Similarly, White is often
capitalized as the preferred term for light-skinned people." Id. at 247,
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I. Hair in the Workplace: The Cultural Expression of
African-American Employees
A. Hair Prohibitions as a Proxy for Race Discrimination
In 2002, a Black male employee of the United Parcel Service
("UPS"), Mr. Eatman, filed a complaint alleging that the UPS
appearance guidelines were racially discriminatory. 9 In 1995, Mr.
Eatman had started wearing his hair in a locked styleo as an
"outward expression" of his commitment to his "Nubian belief
system" and acknowledgement of his ancestry." The plaintiff
asserted that at the time he began wearing his hair in a locked style,
he had become enlightened about the link between locks and his
African identity and heritage.12 The UPS appearance guidelines,
however, required that male employees wear their hair in a
"business-like" manner. 13 The UPS manager expressed that he uses
"common-sense" to determine what hairstyle is "business-like."14
Mr. Eatman's locks were one of the various hairstyles he found
unacceptable. The UPS appearance policy required all employees
with "unconventional hair" to wear a hat; this applied to eighteen
UPS employees, seventeen of whom were Black. Mr. Eatman
expressed to the manager that he thought the hat policy was
discriminatory - probably because one manager asked him,
"What's that shit on your head?"15 After the plaintiff refused to
wear a hat to cover his locks, he was fired. The plaintiff filed suit
and argued that UPS violated Title VII because its appearance
guidelines were facially discriminatory and had an unlawful
disparate impact on African Americans.
9. Eatman v. UPS, 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
10. African locked hair is a hairstyle in which sections of hair are hand-rolled
together in tight, interwoven spirals. The popular term "dread" which customarily
precedes locks when describing the hairstyle connotes negativity and is not a proper
description of the hairstyle. For the purposes of this note, the hairstyle will be referred to
as "locks."
11. Eatinan, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 259.
12. See BYRD supra note 6 at 125. The name "dreadlocks" derives from the days of
the slave trade. When Africans emerged from the slave ships after months spent in
conditions adverse to any personal hygiene, Whites would declare the matted hair that
had grown out of their kinky, unattended heads to be "dreadful." Id.
13. Eatman, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 259. It is fair to note that the UPS appearance policy
also prohibited ponytails, Mohawks, and green hair.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 261.
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Similarly, in Booth v. Maryland 6 the plaintiff challenged his
employer's grooming policy as racially discriminatory because it
prohibited him from wearing his hair in a locked style. The policy
expressed that "hair should be neatly groomed," and the "length,
bulk, or appearance of hair shall not be excessive, ragged, or
unkept."17 Mr. Booth's employer cautioned that his hairstyle did not
comport with the policy because he wore his hair in locks. Mr.
Booth, however, explained that the hairstyle was a necessary tenant
of his faith and a sign of his African identity. 8 The plaintiff couched
his claim under both religious and race discrimination theories. He
alleged the appearance policy did not allow him to follow his
Rastafarian religion and that most members of this religious
organization are African American.
Similar concerns were raised by the plaintiff in Pitts v. Wild
Adventures.19 The plaintiff here, a Black female, wore her hair in
cornrows, 20 but she was informed by her manager that she should
get her hair done in a "pretty style." 21 After the plaintiff altered her
hair in a style that resembled locks, her supervisor continued to
object. The plaintiff refused to alter her hairstyle a second time
because the company did not have an appearance or grooming
policy. Shortly thereafter, Wild Adventures released a grooming
memorandum which prohibited "dreadlocks, cornrows, beads, and
shells."2 2 The plaintiff objected to this memorandum and sent a
written communication to upper management expressing her beliefs
that the policy interfered with the expression of her heritage as an
African American. 23 After objecting to the policy, the plaintiff began
receiving written reprimands and was ultimately terminated.
Finally, in the often cited case of Rogers v. American Airlines, an
African-American female wore her hair in an all-braided hairstyle; a
hairstyle choice expressly prohibited by the defendant's grooming
policy. 24 Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief against
enforcement of the policy alleging that the policy was racially
16. Booth v. Maryland, 327 F.3d 377, 378 (4th Cir. 2003).
17. Id. at 379.
18. See id. According to the plaintiff in Booth, locks are regarded by Rastafari as "a
sign of their African identity" as well as "a religious vow of their separation from the
wider society." Id.
19. Pitts v. Wild Adventures, No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34119, at *3
(M.D. Ga. 2008).
20. Cornrows are made by sectioning the hair and braiding it flat to the scalp.
21. Pitts, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34119, at *3.
22. Id.
23. Id. at *4.
24. Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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discriminatory because it prohibited a hairstyle choice worn by
African-American women. Rogers asserted, quite accurately, that
her cornrow hairstyle has special significance to Black women as it
"has been, historically, a fashion and style adopted by Black
American women, reflective of the cultural, historical essence of
Black women in American society."25 American Airlines stated that
the policy was adopted in order to help the airline project a
"conservative" and "business-like" image; an abstraction recognized
as a legitimate business purpose. 26
B. Judicial Responses
The Eatman court responded that the UPS appearance
guidelines and grooming policy were not facially discriminatory.
The court's justification was that African Americans are not the only
persons who lock their hair, and UPS did not differentiate between
Black locked hair and "imitation" locked hair.27 Finally, the court
expressed that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis
of locked hair, and termination for failing to comply with a
grooming policy is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.28 The
court's insistence that a manager may exercise his or her discretion
to decide which employee hairstyles are "reasonable," directly
implies that locks are an "unreasonable" hairstyle.
The Booth court expressed that the plaintiff's racial
discrimination claim rested upon the same facts as his religious
discrimination claim. The court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the religious discrimination claim with a one-
line rationale: "Because Booth failed to demonstrate that the
defendants enforced DCD 50-43 against him in a discriminatory
fashion because he is African-American, we affirm the district
court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on Booth's
claim of racial discrimination under § 1981."29
The Pitts court, when faced with the alleged racially
discriminatory grooming policy, asserted that grooming policies are
outside the scope of federal antidiscrimination statutes because they
do not discriminate on the basis of an immutable characteristic.
More importantly, the court expressed that the policy related "more
25. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. 229 at 231-32.
26. Id. at 233.
27. Eatman v. UPS 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262 (S. D. N. Y. 2002).
28. Id. at 264.
29. Booth v. Maryland 327 F.3d 377, 383-84 (4th Cir. 2003).
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closely to the employer's choice of how to run his business than to
equality of employment opportunity." 30
Finally, in Rogers the court held the plaintiff's race
discrimination claim failed because she did not allege that an all-
braided hair style was worn exclusively or even predominately by
African-American people. 31 The court expressed that "[an all-
braided hairstyle is an 'easily changed characteristic,' and even if
socio-culturally associated with a particular race or nationality, it is
not an impermissible basis for distinctions in the application of
employment practices by an employer."32
With the same ink, the Rogers court declared that a grooming
policy prohibiting the "Afro/bush" hairstyle might violate Title VII,
because "banning a 'natural hairstyle' would implicate the policies
underlying the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of
immutable characteristics." 33 Unlike the Afro, which the court
recognized as a "product of natural hair growth," the court asserted
that cornrows and other braided hairstyles are merely an "artifice"
and do not qualify as "natural" because they can be easily changed. 4
This raises the question, Is the Afro the only "natural hairstyle"
worn by African Americans? Of course not. African Americans
sport a variety of natural hairstyles which serve as a source of racial
pride, and healthy maintenance of their cultural identity.
In short, courts have held that grooming and appearance
regulations relate "more closely to the employer's choice of how to
run his business than to equality of employment opportunity." 35 But
if the employer's choice in the hairstyle decisions of its employees is
inapposite to the cultural styles worn by African Americans, the
grooming policies are inherently discriminatory and continue to
mandate that African Americans adopt a European-imitated hairdo.
Unless employers present statistical proof evidencing a customer's
choice preferring one hairstyle over another, courts should discard
the "employer's choice of how to run his business" as a legitimate
business purpose.
30. Pitts v. Wild Adventures, No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34119, at *16
(M.D. Ga. 2008) (quoting Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir.
1975)).




35. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975).
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C. Grooming Policies Perpetuate the Belief in the Innate
Superiority of the White Race
Countless African Americans share the fantasy of being White.36
How could it be otherwise in a society whose ideal beauty standard
- blonde hair, pale skinned, with blue or green eyes - embodies
everything the average African American is not?37  Employer
grooming and appearance policies which prohibit certain African-
American hairstyles perpetuate the belief in the innate superiority of
Anglo-American physical characteristics, and establish an inferiority
complex in African-American workers.38 Many African-American
men and women attempt to emulate the physical characteristics of
their White counterparts.39 For example, it was fashionable for
White men of the upper class to wear wigs during the eighteenth
century.40 Inevitably, enslaved Africans began wearing wigs or
fixing their hair to appear as a wig.41
The authors of COLOR COMPLEX: THE POLITICS OF SKIN COLOR
AMONG AFRICAN AMERICANS, 42 assert two theories for this
widespread preference. The first contends that the "establishment"
sets standards for appearance and those who strive for success must
conform accordingly.43 The second asserts the belief that "white is
righter."44 Both theories implicitly place Whites in a higher or better
36. KATHY RUSSELL, MIDGE WILSON & RONALD HALL, THE COLOR COMPLEX: THE
POLITICS OF SKIN COLOR AMONG AFRICAN AMERICANS 41 (First Anchor Books 1993). See
also BYRD, supra note 6, at 14. During slavery, slave owners sought to "pathologize
African features like dark skin and kinky hair" to further demoralize enslaved Blacks.
As a result, Black women began to perceive themselves as ugly and inferior. Id.
37. See BYRD, supra note 6, at 41.
38. See generally BYRD, supra note 6, at 26. Taking on as many Eurocentric attributes
as possible was a goal for people of color. Black people who were working and
interacting with Whites, bought into beauty standards of Whites. Therefore, Blacks did
what they could to emulate European standards of beauty, dress, and behavior. Id.
39. Many African-American men and women are interested in straighter hair, or
disinterested in "kinky hair," because straight European hair has continually been held
up as the beauty ideal. For example, actresses Tyra Banks and artist Beyonce Knowles
continue to be the object of "beauty" in the Black community; yet both women maintain
straight weaved hair, which at times is blonde.
40. BYRD, supra note 6, at 13.
41. Id.
42. RUSSELL, supra note 36.
43. Id. at 67-68.
44. Id.; see also, BYRD, supra note 6, at 22 (noting that White society was more
accepting of lighter-skinned Blacks and because of this, life for Blacks meant a continued
obsession with straightening the hair and lightening the skin).
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position than African Americans. The first theory maintains that
Whites, or in this case, the private workplace, has the innate ability
to dictate the beauty standards of all races seeking admission into its
domain. The second theory encompasses the overarching belief of
employer grooming and appearance regulations - tthat Anglo-
American beauty ideals are more desirable than the natural
appearances of African Americans. Both theories accurately
characterize grooming and appearance policies as perpetuating the
counterfactual superiority/inferiority complex amongst the races.45
Another proposal respecting why many African Americans
emulate the physical appearance of Whites is that Anglo-American
physical characteristics are represented as the normative idea of
beauty and internalized by Blacks. This results in "Black self-hate." 46
Malcolm X expressed, "we [Blacks] hate our characteristics, and we
hate our hair."47 He continued to emphasize that Blacks had been
"mentally colonized" by White supremacist ideologies about
physical appearance, and Blacks would never obtain freedom from
racism until they learned to love their "natural God-created
appearance."48  For whatever reasons, however, the physical
appearance of African Americans took on a different reality than
what Malcolm proposed. Hair straighteners marketed by Anglo
companies suggested to African Americans that only through
changing their physical features will persons of African descent be
afforded class mobility within African-American communities and
obtain social acceptance by Anglo-American culture.49
According to Professor Flagg, these grooming and appearance
policies have reinforced a beauty norm adopted by a dominantly
White culture as racially neutral, and "fail to recognize the ways in
45. See generally BYRD, supra note 6, at 14-26. During slavery, Whites sought to
pathologize African features like kinky hair to further demoralize Blacks, especially
women. Black women then began to perceive themselves as ugly and inferior. In a
world dominated by pale skin and straight hair, African hair was deemed wholly
unattractive and inferior by Whites. Whites continued to reinforce the "good hair"
power structure by selecting straighter haired Blacks for the best positions. Blacks then
internalized this racist rhetoric and passed the pathology on to their sons, daughters and
future generations. Id.
46. See MALCOLM X & ALEX HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (Random
House Publishing Group 1964) (1973). This idea was promulgated by the Nation of
Islam, specifically Minister Malcolm X, during the 1950s and 1960s. The Nation asserted
that Whites had taught Blacks to hate themselves by convincing Blacks that their African
features, including their hair, were inferior. Id. at 264.
47. BYRD, supra note 6, at 48 (quoting, MALCOLM X, supra note 46, at 264).
48. Id.
49. NOLIWE M. ROOKS, HAIR RAISING: BEAUTY, CULTURE AND AFRICAN-AMERICAN
WOMEN (Rutgers University Press 1996).
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which those norms may be in fact covertly race-specific."50
Grooming and appearance policies which prohibit certain African-
American hairstyles unconsciously apply White criteria to the
appearance of African Americans. This inevitably results in a
demand that all grooming practices contrary to whiteness conform
thereto, or suffer adverse employment actions legitimized by the
judiciary.51 Notwithstanding the false superiority/inferiority
complex these policies perpetuate, the judiciary's response to such
claims has been antithetical to Title VII's purpose.
D. The Purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
The factual and racial history of Title VII originates with
slavery. 52 "The relative unemployment rate of [African Americans]
is a startling indicator of the persistent economic problem that
antidiscrimination laws were designed to deal with."53 Historically,
the persistent disparity between non-White and White family
incomes (with incomes of non-White families averaging only about
55% of their White counterparts), could not be entirely explained as
a function of the lower education levels of non-Whites. 54 "This was
crucial to the question of solutions because if the problem were only
gaps in education the corresponding remedy would be to close those
gaps."55 But as one professor articulated, "to put it boldly, about
two-fifths of the difference in average earnings of [W]hites and non-
[W]hites is what it costs to be '[B]lack."'56
As a remedy, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 so that "the workplace be an environment free of
discrimination, where race is not a barrier to opportunity."57 When
an employer ignores the attributes enumerated in the statute,
Congress hoped it would focus on the qualifications of the applicant
or employee.58 According to one Senate memorandum, "[i]ndeed,
50. See Barbara Flagg, Fashioning A Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective
Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2013 (1995).
51. Flagg, supra note 50, at 2013-14.





56. Id. (quoting Paul M. Siegel, On the Cost of Being a Negro, 35 SOC. INQUIRY 41, 56
(1965)).
57. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674 (2009) (quote by Justice Kennedy
articulating one of the important purposes of Title VII).
58. Id. at 2675.
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the very purpose of Title VII is to promote hiring on the basis of job
qualifications, rather than on the basis of race or color."59
If a choice in hairstyle is a result of one's culture, and culture is
an attribute of "race," why then are employer appearance policies
that regulate hairstyles worn by African Americans not in dissension
with Title VII's purpose? The fitting response is: They are. The
legislative history makes clear that Title VII was enacted to eradicate
discriminatory actions in the employment setting. To be actionable,
however, the discriminatory act must be because of a protected
characteristic. Two of Title VII's protected classes are race and
color.6 0 Since "color" refers to the hue of one's skin, it is only logical
that race encompasses characteristics beyond skin pigmentation.
And, indeed, race is emphatically that. It includes stature, skin
color, hair texture, facial structure and historical realities.61 Because
grooming and appearance policies that prohibit certain African-
American hairstyles constrain black cultural expression, and race
encompasses the cultural practices of a group, the author contends
that appearance policies discriminate "because of" race and are
inconsistent with Congress' purpose of eradicating discriminatory
actions in the employment setting.
II. The Race Puzzle: Assumptions and New Paradigms
for Antidiscrimination Goals
A. Normative Approaches
What is race? We now understand that race as a biological
creation has been discredited as a matter of science. 62 The notion of
how to define race is being reshaped. One of the issues faced both
by plaintiffs and courts is how to articulate a precise definition of
race under Title VII.63 Title VII prohibits discrimination based on
59. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,434 (1971).
60. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (2011) ("It shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.").
61. See Ian F. Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 1, 14 (1994).
62. See Ford, supra note 3, at 1806.
63. LEx K. LARSON, LARSON'S EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (Matthew Bender, 2d
ed. 1997).
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sex, race, color, religion, or national origin.64 Because the statute
expressly distinguishes between discrimination based on race and
discrimination based on color, the definition of each must be patently
distinct. 65 Color refers to the skin pigmentation of a particular
people or group, especially when other than white.66 The very terms
by which we describe one another, white, black, etc. describe skin
color and nothing more. Although race encompasses skin color, its
definition is not so limited. 67 Defining race, therefore, has been
somewhat frustrating. 68
Professor Ian F. Haney Lopez argues that race must be viewed
as a social construction; that is, the result of "human interaction
rather than natural differentiation." 6 9 One theory he discards, while
advancing the social construction argument, is the notion that race
can be biologically detected.70 He asserts that one's race is not
determined by a single gene or a gene cluster. The vast populations
commonly divided into black, white, brown, red, and yellow are not
genetically distinguishable. 71 The present discussion suggests that
race is an amalgamation of skin color and the cultural practices of a
people. Race under Title VII should, therefore, be understood to
encompass the cultural practices and characteristics of a people
sharing similar ancestry.
64. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added).
65. The Court has expressed that the test of race afforded by the mere color of one's
skin is impracticable as that differs between members of the same race, even among
Anglo-Saxons. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 197 (1922). See also Lopez, supra note
61, at 15 (asserting that the Court in Ozawa recognized that race is not a function of skin
color alone).
66. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, THIRD COLLEGE EDITION (Victoria
Neufeldt & David B. Guralnik eds., 1988) ("The skin pigmentation of a particular people
or racial group, esp. when other than white.").
67. See, e.g., EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMIssION (EEOC) COMPLIANCE
MANUAL (2006), available at http:// www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.pdf
(providing that Title VII's prohibition of race discrimination encompasses ancestry,
physical characteristics, culture, etc.).
68. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 237, 239 (1995). Justice Scalia
declared when striking down an affirmative action program, "In the eyes of the
government, we are just one race here. It is American." Id. This statement is firmly
contradicted by the use of race throughout American history to distinguish one group of
citizens from another. Perhaps Justice Scalia's remark reflects the Court's inability to
adequately define what race is.
69. See Lopez, supra note 61, at 27.
70. Id. at 11-15.
71. Id. at 13.
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B. African-American Culture as Race
Culture is the "body of beliefs, knowledge, traditions and ways
of life that is passed on from generation to generation in . . .
communities." 72 Certain dress and grooming practices are cultural
traditions in the African-American community; yet, because these
practices are not considered immutable, they are not seen as being
indicative of one's race.73 The characteristic that is immutable, color,
is already protected under Title VII. As a result, race as employed
under Title VII must suggest something mutable - something I
advance is culture.
Professor Madhavi Sunder writes that one of the earliest
definitions of culture was articulated by nineteenth and twentieth
century anthropologists as "a 'thing' that survives and is imposed on
generation after generation." 74 Sunder also notes that "for the most
part . . . legal specialists who are asked to respond to claims [of
cultural recognition] hold an outmoded conception of culture as a
thing that is possessed, or owned, by a largely homogeneous and discrete,
or bounded group." 75 The more modernly accepted description of
culture, according to Sunder, is that culture is something that travels
beyond geographical boundaries and not confined to any particular
race.76 This note urges that culture is ancestrally distinct, generally
restricted to a particular people and is determinative of one's race.?
Culture, therefore, includes such traits as physical features, hair
texture, language, and surname.78
72. See Marina Hadjioannou, The International Human Right to Culture: Reclamation of
the Cultural Identities of Indigenous Peoples Under International Law, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 201, 204
(2005).
73. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") declares that Title VII
does protect against "discrimination on the basis of an immutable characteristic
associated with race such as skin color, hair texture, or certain facial features." EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMIssIoN, FACT SHEET: RACE/COLOR DISCRIMINATION,
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-race.cfm (last visited Oct. 29,
2011). However, because clothing and hairstyles are cultural practices, rather than
physical traits one is born with, they are not considered immutable.
74. Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 507 (2001).
75. Id. at 510.
76. Id. at 511.
77. Id. at 512 n.85 (quoting Edward T. Hall, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION, 177 (1966)
"IN]o matter how hard a man tries it is impossible for him to divest himself of his own
culture, for it has penetrated to the roots of his nervous system and determines how he
perceives the world"; also quoting Edward Sapir, LANGUAGE 221 (1921) "[C]ulture [is]
the socially inherited assemblage of practices and beliefs that determines the texture of
our lives.").
78. See Juan Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin"
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Professor Kenji Yoshino, in his article Covering, asserts that the
foremost form of discrimination today is cultural discrimination. 79
Yoshino articulates three ways in which a person alters her culture
in order to avoid discrimination: by converting, by passing, or by
covering.80 Conversion occurs when a person's underlying identity
is altered. Passing occurs when the identity is not altered, but
hidden. Finally, covering occurs when a person neither alters nor
hides her identity, but downplays it.81
Yoshino uses the story of African-American attorney Lawrence
Mungin, to illustrate some of the cultural characteristics he
downplayed in order to find acceptance in Anglo-American
mainstream society.82 Mungin ceased cooking collard greens,
avoided African-American groups, and skipped free lunch so he
would not be seen by his White counterparts receiving government-
sponsored meals. These actions were taken by Mungin, according to
Yoshino, to "deemphasize his racial identity." 83 Based on this
example, it bears emphasis that "racial identity" encompasses
mutable cultural behaviors which are socially correlated with a
particular people.
"Culture-race" holds that race encompasses "broadly shared
beliefs and social practices, physical and spiritual communities, and
racial traditions of self-awareness as well as actions based on that
self-awareness."84 This theory defines race as the set of communal
practices which one decides to engage.85 These practices inevitably
include choice of hairstyle and even language.86 Professor Juan
Perea furthers the "culture-race" argument by noting, "ethnic group
membership is dependent upon a constellation of traits, some of
which are more perceptible and immediately obvious than others."87
These perceived differences mark persons as belonging to the
Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 861 (1994).
79. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002).
80. Yoshino, supra note 79, at 772.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 879.
83. Id. at 881.
84. Id. at 888 (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Id.
86. See id. at 890, 896-97. Yoshino points out that in the Rogers case, hair was not a
simple attribute but rather a site of racial contest. Id. at 896. Similarly, commentators
have argued that "Black English" is constitutive of race. Id. at 897. But see, Hernandez v.
New York, 500 U.S. 352, 370-72 (1991), in which two Latino jurors were stricken from the
jury because of their language. The court held that the strikes were language based, and
not race based.
87. See Perea, supra note 78, at 834-35.
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cultural group or not.88 Conceptually, when we "mark" a person,
we decide their race. The racial marks include, among other things:
skin color, dress, speech or accent, surnames and cast features.89
Accordingly, when an African American is discriminated
against, the discrimination is because of a cultural identity that
marks the person as belonging to a particular race. For instance,
African Americans may have a distinctive variation of the English
language,90 have surnames that we consider "Black" in nature, 91 or
sport their hair in certain styles. In essence, distinctive physical
characteristics and imperceptible characteristics of African
Americans are what mark persons as a member of that race. The
racial identity of African Americans may, therefore, encompass
traditional hairstyle choices that differ from the styles worn by non-
group members and serve as a basis for unlawful discrimination.
Professor Richard Ford argues that a right to cultural protection
invites the "courts to determine which expressions are authentic and
therefore deserving of protection." 92 The inevitable result, he posits,
will be that members of a race who do not fit within the cultural
style being protected will be discredited.93 Clearly stated, if a Black
person does not look Black or dress Black, then they will lack racial
legitimacy.
This absolutely is not the result of a right to cultural protection.
There are many African-American traits, such as surnames or
hairstyle choices, which are not adopted by every member of the
race. These individuals are emphatically members of the African-
American race and have only decided to "cover" their cultural
characteristics.94  The right-to-culture protection doesn't exclude
members of the race, but prohibits physical characteristics which
identify one as belonging to a specific race from being a proxy for
unlawful racial discrimination.
Professor Ford is critical of what he phrases "racial culture
discourse."95  For example, he suggests that if "an all-braided
88. Id. at 835 (quoting GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 9 (25th
Anniversary ed. 1979). ("[Plerceptible differences are of basic importance in
distinguishing between out-group and in-group members.").
89. Perea, supra note 78, at 835.
90. See Yoshino, supra note 79, at 897 (noting the social reality of Black English).
91. See Perea, supra note 78, at 837 ("In our culture, foreign-sounding names, like
corresponding accents or languages, often elicit prejudice.").
92. Ford, supra note 3, at 1811.
93. Id.
94. See Yoshino, supra note 79, at 772.
95. See Ford, supra note 3, at 1812 ("At best, racial cultural discourse is a bullet proof
jacket with arms that tie in the back.").
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hairstyle is the cultural essence of Black women by law, mightn't this
imply that Ms. Derek and her emulators are black-coiffed minstrels
or 'white Negro' wanna-bees?" 96 Maybe so. If Bo Derek or her
emulators are adopting African-American hairstyle choices and
seeking admission into an alien culture, they may very well be
described as imitating "Negro" culture.
Imitating an alien culture, however, is not sinful in and of itself.
African Americans have mastered this art, and many do not view
their behavior as unbecoming. The fact remains, however, that
despite a shared cultural geography, African Americans and Anglo-
Americans conceivably have different cultural characteristics and
realities. These cultural differences have served as a proxy for
discriminatory animus.97
C. Hair as Conceptualized in African-American Culture
The symbolization of African-American hair originates in
Africa.98 The current hairstyles being prohibited by grooming and
appearance policies were worn in Africa by the ancestors of African
Americans and are, without question, intrinsic to African-American
culture.99 Authors Ayana D. Byrd & Lori L. Tharps write, "[e]ver
since African civilizations bloomed, hairstyles have been used to
indicate a person's marital status, age, religion, ethnic identity,
wealth, and rank within the community .. . The hairstyle also served
as an indicator of a person's geographic origins."10o
Although the justification for cutting Africans' hair before
commencing the middle passage may have been sanitary, Byrd and
Tharps note that removing the hair of an African was seen as taking
away their identity.1ol The ability to separate Africans from their
96. See RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 26 (Princeton
University Press 2005) (describing Ms. Derek, a White female actress who appeared in a
1979 film sporting her hair in cornrows).
97. NA'iM AKBAR, PAPERS IN AFRIKAN PSYCHOLOGY 107 (Mind Productions &
Associates, Inc. 2004).
98. See BYRD, supra note 6, at 1 (noting the story of Black hair begins where
everything began - in Africa).
99. Id. at 1-2. The variety of hair textures from western Africa range from kinky
curls worn by the Mandingos to the flowing locks of the Ashanti. These hairstyles were
worn by the west Africans who filled the slave ships that sailed to the "New World." Id.
In addition, the author discusses the importance of hairstyle to the Kuramo of Nigeria
and the Wolof of Senegal. Id.
100. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). Also states that hair has been intrinsic to the
Africans' sense of self for thousands of years. Id.
101. Id. at 10.
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cultural identity simply by removing their hair has been implicitly
carried over into modern American society through Anglo-
normative appearance and grooming regulations. Not only has hair
played a determining role in African Americans' physical aesthetics
and culture, but hair has long been considered a determinant of
African ancestry.102
Authors Byrd and Tharps again note that more than skin color,
"the hair was considered the most telling feature of [N]egro
status."10 3 Because many enslaved Blacks had skin hue similar to
that of Whites, the criterion for characterizing one as a Negro was
based on hair texture.104 If the person's hair showed just a little
kinkiness, that person could not be considered White. 105 Not only
was this the test employed by lay whites, the judiciary acquired this
"hair test" and began using it as a rule to determine one's race.106
Beginning as early as 1806, the determination of one's race could
hinge upon whether the individual had a "wooly head of hair." 107 In
Hudgins v. Wright, three enslaved women sued for their freedom. 108
Because the determination of whether one was born free or enslaved
followed the maternal line, the women argued they descended from
a free maternal ancestor - a free Indian woman.109 The fate of the
women rode upon physical characteristics, including the texture of
their hair, which served to mark their race.110 Because the youngest
child had hair texture the same as those of Whites, the court ruled
the women were free."' The women were not considered African or
descendants of Africans because their hair was long and straight.112
Still today, lay persons continue to employ the "hair test" to
determine the race of someone whose skin color doesn't provide a
definitive answer. For instance, while departing a local grocery
store, the author graciously delivered a shopping cart back to the
102. See Lopez, supra note 61, at 4-5 (citing to Hudgins v. Wright, 11 Va. 134 Sup. Ct.
App. 1806) (noting that the Hudgins court used hair to determine whether the Petitioners
were of African ancestry).
103. See BYRD, supra note 6, at 17-18.
104. Id. at 18.
105. Id.
106. See Lopez, supra note 61, at 2.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2 (Lopez also writes that Hudgins determined that one is Black if "one has
a flat nose or wooly head of hair.").
111. Id. at 1-2 ("[Tjhe youngest [had] ... the characteristic features, the complexion,
the hair, and eyes ... the same as those of whites").
112. Id. at 2.
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store's employee who was collecting shopping carts in the parking
lot. After delivering the cart and noticing the dark skin hue of the
employee, the author acknowledged the employee with brotherly love
by stating thank you "brother."113 The author then gazed at the
employee's hair texture and concluded that the employee was not a
member of the African-American race." 4
The social hair test is used systematically to determine the race of
a person whose skin color provides no determinative answer
concerning their racial identity. Because of the historical truths and
experiences of African Americans, it is only prudent for courts to
recognize that African-American hair identity is rooted in African
tradition. As such, natural styles are as much of a determinate of
racial identity as melanoid skin.
III. A New Title VII Framework
A. From Plan to Reality
Although Adarand Constructors v. Pena involved an affirmative
action program, Justice Thomas' concurring opinion is highly
relevant to this discussion. Justice Thomas declared, "the
government cannot make us equal; it can only recognize, respect, and
protect us as equal before the law."115 If our courts are charged with
the duty to recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law,
a new Title VII framework is necessary to decide whether employer
grooming and appearance policies are racially discriminatory.
The Foreseeable Impact Model, introduced by Professor Flagg,
appears quite favorable. 116 The first step in the Foreseeable Impact
Model is for the plaintiff to demonstrate that an unfavorable
employment action was based on the employee lacking a
characteristic more frequently possessed by Whites than by African
Americans. 117 In essence, an African American who chooses to wear
her hair in locks would have to show that her employer's conformity
requirement implicitly incorporated characteristics more often found
113. The term "brother" is used by one African-American man to another to
demonstrate membership in the race, support, and love.
114. The employee had dark hair, but it was very thin and resembled the texture of
one who is from or whose ancestors are from Asia.
115. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995).
116. See Flagg, supra note 50, at 2039.
117. Id. at 2040. Although the Professor's original analysis compared Whites with
non-Whites, making a comparison between Whites and Blacks when grooming and
appearance policies are concerned appears more appropriate.
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in Whites than in Blacks - straight hair.118 Better said, the plaintiff
would be required to show that the policy that is the basis for the
adverse employment action is White-specific. The second
requirement is for the plaintiff to prove the grooming policy at issue
is one that is favorably regarded by Whites. 119 Such a showing may
be made by demonstrating a negative impact on Blacks. 120
The first prong of the Foreseeable Impact Model raises concerns.
For example, an African-American plaintiff arguing that a
prohibition on cornrows is racially discriminatory would have a
hard time demonstrating that straight hair is a White specific
characteristic; especially with the outstanding number of African
Americans who prefer to wear their hair straight. In like manner,
the second prong of the Foreseeable Impact Model raises similar
concerns. A prohibition of cornrows may be a policy that is
favorably regarded by both Anglo- and African Americans.
Although the Foreseeable Impact Model introduced by
Professor Flagg has its objections, as do other Title VII frameworks,
it may prove to be successful when examining claims alleging the
racially discriminatory nature of certain appearance and grooming
policies. Under this framework, employers will maintain the
business necessity defense. 121 The defense will allow employers to
maintain legitimate grooming and appearance policies that are job
related for the position in question and consistent with their business
necessity.
Another solution may be for plaintiffs to turn to international
human rights law. Under international law, every human being has
a right to culture. 122 Professor Marina Hadjioannou writes that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"), the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"), the
International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination ("ICEARD"), the Covenant Against Discrimination in
Education ("CADE"), and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR") all mention the universal right of all people to participate
in culture.123
Furthermore, Professor Hadjioannou demonstrates that Article
118. Id.
119. Flagg, supra note 50, at 2040.
120. Id. at 2041.
121. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (U.S. 1971). The Supreme
Court articulated that if the business practice which operates to exclude minorities
cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.
122. See Hadjioannou, supra note 72, at 205.
123. Id.
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27 of the ICCPR demands that members of "ethnic ... minorities ...
shall not be denied the right . . . to enjoy their own culture."124
Because of the historical link between hairstyles in ancient African
culture and the hairstyles choices of modern African Americans,
plaintiffs should look to challenge these appearance and grooming
policies as an abridgement of cultural enjoyment and a violation of
international human rights law.
B. The Challenge of Implementation
One of the existing Title VII frameworks requires the plaintiff to
show that the adverse employment action was taken "because of"
membership in a protected class. Employer grooming policies do
not come within the purview of the "because of race" jurisprudence,
which triggers liability, solely because courts have failed to
acknowledge that certain hairstyle choices are cultural practices of a
specific race.
The "right-to-culture" argument does raise several concerns,
however, as Professor Richard Ford acknowledges. He insists that
"cultural identity rights" inevitably require courts to determine
which expressions are authentic and therefore deserving of
protection.125  Moreover, he writes that "[ulnless advocates of
cultural rights can specifically and coherently define the traits they
would protect and distinguish [these traits] from behavior in
general, their proposals will inevitably require courts to define racial
culture."126
We may suppose that any plaintiff, who possesses the fortitude
to bring a race discrimination claim because of an inability to express
their culture, will be able to adequately define which cultural
behaviors are deserving of protection and those that are not.
Specifically, civil rights and antidiscrimination lawyers possess the
tools and skill set to assist in performing the requisite research
before advocating which African-American behavior practices
constitute African-American culture and which do not.
Determining "which expressions are authentic" is not the
challenge. The challenge abides in the judiciary's inability to
advance a precise definition of race under Title VII. Were it to do so,
antidiscrimination lawyers would know which claims are valid race
discrimination claims and which are not. However, since this
124. Id.
125. See Ford, supra note 3, at 1812.
126. Id. at 1813.
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definition is yet to be afforded, civil rights and antidiscrimination
lawyers should continue to press the cultural rights issue before
courts and provide an adequate showing of which behaviors are
sufficient for cultural protection.
Additionally, instead of plaintiffs proving that the adverse
employment action was taken "because of" blackness, courts should
also find liability when the adverse employment action was taken
"because of" an inability to conform to whiteness - the Foreseeable
Impact Model. Such a framework would serve a dual purpose.
First, it would "dismantle the practices and institutions that continue
to produce and reinforce racial subordination." 127 Second, the
Foreseeable Impact Model would safeguard group behaviors which
serve as a legitimate expression of cultural realities.
Hair has emphatically been, and continues to be, the follicular
stamp of African-American heritage. Courts must recognize this
fact and begin to reach conclusions in accord with Lord Denning's
judicial philosophy. Denning, a twenthieth century British judge,
remarked:
My root belief is that the proper role of a judge is to do
justice between the parties before him. If there is any rule
of law that impairs the doing of justice, then it is the
province of the judge to do all he legitimately can to avoid
that rule, or even to change it, so as to do justice in the
instant case before him. He need not wait for the legislature
to intervene: because that can never be of any help in the
instant case.128
Conclusion
Is it "impossible to imagine a situation in which a frivolous"
grooming policy "so disparately impacts a protected class" that one
can "infer from [its] existence . . . that the employer adopted the
guideline as a subterfuge for discrimination?"129  Are African
Americans required to become assimilationist, or will they be able
express their cultural heritage without being victims of race
discrimination? The resolution of this conundrum is for courts to
127. Ford, supra note 3, at 1805.
128. JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART
OF PERSUADING JUDGES 27 (Thompson/West 2008) (quoting LORD DENNING, THE FAMILY
STORY 174 (1981)).
129. Eatman v. UPS, 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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provide a precise definition of race under Title VII jurisprudence or
recognize a right to culture. Currently, Title VII expressly prohibits
employment discrimination because of race and discrimination
because of color. Color discrimination is separately prohibited and is
limited to the skin hue of the person. Race discrimination, therefore,
should be defined to encompass the cultural behaviors and practices
of a particular group sharing a common ancestry.
Because current antidiscrimination law emphasizes
immutability as a prerequisite for racial protection, African-
American hairstyle choices are unable to obtain judicial recognition
and legal protection. A new Title VII framework should be adopted
by courts to distinguish between grooming and appearance policies
that are a proxy for race discrimination and those which legitimately
serve a business necessity. Professor Flagg's Foreseeable Impact
Model is the preferred framework, albeit not flawless. Under this
model, Title VII is violated when an African American fails to
conform to a policy that is both White-specific and favorably
regarded by Whites. Civil rights and antidiscrimination lawyers are
encouraged to look beyond domestic laws for cultural protection
and introduce international human rights law as an authentic means
of protecting African-American cultural expressions.
This note argues for the expansion of antidiscrimination law to
prohibit grooming and appearance policies that constrain the
cultural expression of minority workers. This change would
reassure that the livelihood of many African-American employees
does not rely on their ability to assimilate their looks into Anglo-
American normative beauty ideals.
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